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Abstract
In this paper we study the connections between network structure, opinion dynamics, and an
adversary’s power to artificially induce disagreements. We approach these questions by extending
models of opinion formation in the mathematical social sciences to represent scenarios, familiar from
recent events, in which external actors have sought to destabilize communities through sophisticated
information warfare tactics via fake news and bots. In many instances, the intrinsic goals of these
efforts are not necessarily to shift the overall sentiment of the network towards a particular policy,
but rather to induce discord. These perturbations will diffuse via opinion dynamics on the underlying
network, through mechanisms that have been analyzed and abstracted through work in computer
science and the social sciences.
Here we investigate the properties of such attacks, considering optimal strategies both for the
adversary seeking to create disagreement and for the entities tasked with defending the network from
attack. By employing spectral techniques, we show that for different formulations of these types of
objectives, different regimes of the spectral structure of the network will limit the adversary’s capacity
to sow discord; in fact, somewhat surprisingly, the entire spectrum can be relevant, rather than just
the extreme eigenvectors. Via the strong connections between spectral and structural properties of
graphs, we are able to qualitatively describe which networks are most vulnerable or resilient against
these perturbations. We then consider the algorithmic task of a network defender to mitigate these sorts
of adversarial attacks by insulating nodes heterogeneously; we show that, by considering the geometry
of this problem, this optimization task can be efficiently solved via convex programming. Finally,
we generalize these results to allow for two network structures, where the opinion dynamics process
and the measurement of disagreement become uncoupled; for instance, this may arise when opinion
dynamics are controlled an online community via social media, while disagreement is measured along
“real-world” connections. We characterize conditions on the relationship between these two graphs
that will determine how much power the adversary gains when this occurs.
1 Introduction
People’s opinions are shaped by their interactions with others. The resulting process of opinion dynamics
— the interplay between opinion formation and the network structure of these interactions — has been
of great interest in the political science, sociology, economics, and computer science communities among
others.
∗Cornell University, Department of Applied Mathematics. Supported by NSF grant CCF-1408673 and AFOSR grant
F5684A1. Email: jsg355@cornell.edu.
†Cornell University, Department of Computer Science. Supported in part by a Simons Investigator Award, a Vannevar
Bush Faculty Fellowship, a MURI grant, a MacArthur Foundation grant, and AFOSR grant F5684A1. Email: klein-
berg@cornell.edu.
‡Cornell University, Department of Computer Science. Supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1408673, CCF-1563714,
and AFOSR grant F5684A1. Email: eva.tardos@cornell.edu.
1
A range of mathematical models have been proposed for opinion dynamics in social networks, repre-
senting people as nodes in the network. In typical models, each node in a weighted graph G = (V,E)
holds a real-valued opinion that updates in response to the values in their network neighborhood. In
perhaps the most natural model, the repeated-averaging model of DeGroot, each node repeatedly takes a
weighted average of its own opinion with those of its neighbors; using rich connections between stochastic
matrices and Markov chains, it is possible to show that these dynamics lead to all individuals sharing a
consensus opinion in the limit [1]. Much work in the economics and social science literature has studied
fundamental questions in this basic model [2].
A typical feature of real-world networks, however, is that even approximate consensus is rarely, if ever,
achieved. For that reason, richer models like the Friedkin-Johnsen variation of the standard DeGroot
model [3] or the bounded-confidence Hegselmann-Krause model [4] have been proposed to give plausible
explanations for how these long-term disagreements can persist while maintaining the strong intuition
that one will account for and adjust to the opinions and expressed behaviors of those near them. In this
work, we will take the Friedkin-Johnsen model as a primitive; these dynamics closely follow the basic
DeGroot model, but allow each node to hold their own immutable internal opinion which always gets
incorporated during the repeated averaging.
Discord and Adversarial Perturbations. These types of mathematical models have been used
extensively to study both the phenomena associated with consensus and polarization, as well as the role
of interventions designed to shift opinions, in which targeting a few individual opinions can shift many
others via the network dynamics. While the questions have been quite diverse, they share a crucial
underlying assumption, which is that the entities intervening in the process have a preferred opinion that
they are seeking to promote.
In the real-world settings that motivate these models, however, a number of important developments
have been commanding increasing attention in the past few years. One of these is the rising concern about
situations in which outside entities intervene not to promote a specific opinion, but instead to induce a lack
of consensus, with the explicit intention of sowing discord. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice
Special Counsel’s Office argues in their 2017 indictment of the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA)
that the IRA used social media and targeted advertising with “a strategic goal to sow discord in the U.S.
political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election” [5]. This behavior has been seen in multiple
countries, and is not limited to any one actor. For example, the doctrine of offensive information warfare
by the U.S. intelligence community includes provisions for the instigation of discord between opposing
parties [6]. More recently, Twitter disclosed in 2019 that external bots made a coordinated effort to “sow
political discord in Hong Kong” with the aim of making protesters less effective at organizing during the
Hong Kong independence movement [7]. It is to be expected that as social media becomes more and
more prevalent, these sorts of external influences and behaviors will become more frequent.
In such instances, the apparent aim of these attacks is not directly to promote a specific policy agenda,
but rather simply to induce disagreement; correspondingly, these external actors strive for more abstract
objectives and therefore exhibit more complicated behavior. For example, analysis of Twitter data in the
past few years has revealed how bots sponsored in some cases by state actors managed to play both sides
of some existing issue to exploit divisions along racial lines, pro- and anti-vaccine groups, NFL kneeling,
and gun reform, among other matters [8, 9, 10].
For these types of scenarios, in which an adversary is seeking to promote disagreement, we need to look
beyond existing mathematical formulations of opinion maximization and influence in networks. We show
how to define a new set of questions in the underlying models of opinion dynamics based on an adversary
whose objective function is some measure of node-to-node disagreement. In this paper, we formalize such
questions; roughly speaking, we will start from instances of the Friedkin-Johnsen model in which all nodes’
internal opinions are at equilibrium, e.g., they are all equal to 0, and then we will allow an adversary
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to perturb these internal opinion subject to some radius constraint modeling resource constraint of the
attacker. These seeded internal opinions then diffuse across the network to reach an equilibrium under
the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, at which point some measure of disagreement among adjacent nodes is
measured. Our main goal is to characterize the interplay between graph structure and the adversary’s
power: which networks are most susceptible to or resilient to these kinds of perturbations; how can
the adversary most efficiently spend a bounded amount of resource in order to produce the maximum
disagreement; and how can we most effectively defend a network against such attacks? We will find that
these types of questions bring into play new network properties that have not typically arisen in the
analysis of traditional questions around consensus, polarization, and opinion maximization.
1.1 Our Results
Spectral Properties of Discord. In this work an adversary seeking to maximize some measure of
discord among the nodes of a network would like to perturb the internal opinions of the nodes by a
bounded amount in order to produce as much discord as possible under the resulting opinion dynamics.
We first show that many such objectives for such an actor can be naturally posed as the maximization
of an associated quadratic form of the underlying graph Laplacian. The simple, but crucial observation
is that this directly connects the adversary’s power in attaining their objective with the eigenvalues of
some function of the underlying graph. The graph Laplacian is an extremely well-studied object, whose
spectral properties are known to be good approximations of combinatorial features of the underlying
network; this connection will allow us to qualitatively understand what structural properties of the graph
matter in these different settings.
For different discord objectives, we find that different regimes of the spectral structure of the un-
derlying networks characterize the ability of this adversary to succeed in their aim. In perhaps the
most natural case, we define the disagreement on an edge of the network to be the squared difference
of the opinions at the edge’s endpoints; and we define the disagreement of the network to be the sum
of the disagreements on all its edges. The challenge for an adversary in maximizing disagreement is
that the same network is being used both by the opinion dynamics to average away the disagreement,
and by the objective function to measure the disagreement. We can study this effect in terms of a key
one-dimensional parameter t inherent in the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model, controlling the
relative weight of a node’s internal opinion and neighboring opinions in determining how it updates its
opinion in the next time period. We find, strikingly, that as t ranges from 0 to ∞, the optimal strategy
for the adversary is determined by a sequence of vectors that ranges over precisely the set of eigenvectors
of the graph Laplacian. This means that for an adversary seeking to induce maximum disagreement, the
entire eigenstructure of the network is relevant.
This dependence on the entire eigenstructure forms a strong contrast with standard graph objective
functions that have a spectral interpretation, where we typically find a dependence only on the extreme
eigenvectors. Here, by contrast, each eigenvector controls the optimal choice for the adversary at some
setting of the opinion dynamics.
We also consider additional discord objectives, finding that the contrast extends here too, with the
adversary’s optimal behavior for these other objectives dependent on extreme eigenvectors. In particular,
when the adversary’s objective is to maximize the polarization-disagreement index of Musco, Musco, and
Tsourakakis [11], the ability of the adversary is directly controlled by the second smallest eigenvalue of
the graph Laplacian. Somewhat surprisingly, an infinite-time horizon form of the maximum disagreement
objective is also completely determined by the second smallest eigenvalue, despite not holding for the
one-period time horizon mentioned above. Through these well-studied connections between the spectral
and combinatorial structures of graphs, we can then qualitatively describe which networks, under the
Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, are robust to these sorts of adversarial perturbations.
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Network Defense. In Section 4, we generalize the basic model and consider the converse problem
of minimizing the ability of such an adversary to promote their objective. Following the general principle
that the network topology ought be somewhat difficult to meaningfully change, we allow a network
defender to insulate the individuals in the network heterogeneously. Intuitively, this corresponds to
making these individuals more difficult for an adversary to influence via their internal opinion. This
might be achieved, for instance, through technological literacy initiatives to make it more difficult for
certain individuals to be susceptible to the normal modes by which an external actor may seed internal
opinions, like bots or fake news.
Formally, we will consider a two-player min-max game, where a network defender can first het-
erogeneously weigh different individuals in the network (subject to some explicit normalization); the
interpretation is that the defender can make some individuals less malleable to seeding. The adversary
then solves their objective function as before, but subject to these new weights. The constraints on the
defender’s choice will include the option to keep the individuals’ weights the same as above, so that this
optimization problem for the defender is upper-bounded by the previous analyses. On the algorithmic
side, our main technical contribution in this section is to show that while the adversary’s inner maximiza-
tion problem no longer has the well-known analytic connection to eigenvalues, for many choices of the
adversary’s objective and weight normalization, the network defender’s problem can be globally solved
using convex programming. We show this by analyzing the geometry of the defender and adversary’s
optimization problems. In particular, this implies the network defender’s problem can be solved efficiently.
Mixed-Graph Objectives. As noted above, the underlying network is playing two distinct roles in
our basic model of disagreement: it serves to average opinions of neighboring nodes, and it also serves to
measure the disagreement between neighbors in the resulting equilibrium of the opinion dynamics. But
if we look at current discussions of the ways in which online interaction may be exacerbating conflict
among different opinions, a crucial theme is the way in which the online content that shapes our opinions
is being transmitted across networks that may be quite different from the social networks linking us to
the people with whom we interact on a daily basis.
These considerations suggest that we return to the adversary’s disagreement maximization problem,
but when the network where disagreement is measured can be different from the network where the
Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics take place. The individuals and communities one interacts with on
social media can be quite global in nature, as well as relatively anonymous and self-selecting; in contrast,
one’s real-world interactions are far more dictated by other factors like geography and occupation. It is
thus quite natural to think of opinion formation as occurring somewhat orthogonally to these real-world
interactions. To sow discord, an adversary might hope to induce disagreement measured via these real-
world connections, but must do so filtered through the opinion dynamics in the online world. Intuitively,
if the opinion graph which does the smoothing of internal opinions and the disagreement graph look very
different, an adversary will be much more powerful than what is possible in the basic model when these
graphs must be the same.
To understand this setup, we generalize the adversary’s problem with mixed-graph objective functions
in the natural way by considering two distinct graphs at once. One might expect that the adversary is
most limited when the opinion graph and disagreement graphs are the same, as then the opinion dynamics
smooth out the seeded opinions along the exact same network where disagreements will be measured.
Somewhat surprisingly, we show that it is not always the case, even subject to some natural degree
normalization; there are explicit, simple disagreement graphs where a different opinion formation graph
provably lowers the adversary’s ability to induce disagreement by a non-negligible amount. However, we
also give a general lower bound that suggests that these examples are somewhat pathological in that,
typically, having different graphs will help the adversary in this aim compared to the single-graph setting.
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For other disagreement graphs, it will in fact turn out that they are optimal for themselves.
On the one hand, if the measurement and disagreement graphs are highly similar, edge-by-edge, then
the adversary’s basic optimization problem has not really changed from the single-graph setting. This
is indeed the case, via an easy continuity argument, but not necessary. To that end, we show that if
the two graphs are good spectral approximations for each other, then the objective of the adversary is
essentially unchanged. It is well-known using celebrated results of Batson, Spielman, and Srivastava the
every graph, no matter how dense, has a spectral approximation corresponding to much sparser graph
[12]. In particular, this implies that it is not necessary at all for the two graphs to be physically quite
similar, only spectrally quite similar.
In the converse direction, it is still quite intuitive that the more dissimilar the two graphs are, the
more an adversary will be able to induce disagreement. We show that spectral dissimilarity, appropri-
ately defined, is sufficient for this purpose. Perhaps more interestingly, by specializing to combinatorial
structure, it will follow that if the two graphs are misaligned in the sense that their cut structure dif-
fers by a large amount along any subset of nodes, then necessarily the adversary is far more capable of
inducing disagreement than in the single-graph setting. This provides some theoretical justification for
why external actors have been able to effectively sow discord; this can happen when opinion formation
and disagreement become uncoupled, as is possible with social media platforms.
1.2 Related Work
To our knowledge, the focus on interventions to increase discord in the Friedkin-Johnsen model is new.
In its emphasis on interventions in such models more generally, our work has connections to that of
Gionis, et al [13]. In their work, the authors establish the NP-hardness of a natural opinion maximiza-
tion problem work in the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics. They also derive a random walk interpretation
of these dynamics to establish submodularity of their problem, enabling a polynomial-time (1 − 1/e)-
approximation algorithm using the natural greedy algorithm. We focus on different optimization tasks
motivated by recent events aimed at sowing discord in opinion dynamics, and moreover, we do not focus
on the computational hardness of such tasks. Indeed, in our setting, the optimization problems will be
computationally tractable. Instead, our emphasis will be on the relationship between the graph and the
adversary’s power in achieving their aims.
Subsequent work by Musco, Musco, and Tsourakakis [11] considered a problem, given either a fixed
graph topology or fixed initial opinions, of determining the optimal choice of the other to minimize their
polarization-disagreement index metric. Their main results shows that both of these problems can be
efficiently solved via convex optimization. Our approach deviates from theirs in multiple ways: for one,
motivated by these recent events, we are interested in a worst-case, adversarial analysis, not in finding
best-case settings. Moreover, our general philosophy is that the graph topology for the dynamics is
typically quite immutable; the problems we consider will treat the underlying graphs as fixed. We will
also be principally concerned with analytically characterizing an adversary’s power in these settings in
relation to the underlying graph. In a different direction, prior work by Bindel, Kleinberg, and Oren
interprets the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics as the Nash equilibrium of a natural quadratic cost function
[14]; they then characterize the price of anarchy of this equilibrium, namely the ratio between the cost
at equilibrium with that of the global optimizer. By using spectral techniques, they establish an upper
bound of 9/8 on this ratio, thereby showing that the equilibrium solution is a good minimizer of the
global cost function.
Closest to the motivation for our work is an independent paper by Chen and Ra´cz [15] who consider
the power of an adversary seeking to induce discord within the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, but subject
to a sparsity constraint. Their approach relies primarily on carefully bounding the quantities that arise in
the associated Laplacian matrices, but without the use of spectral techniques. We explain the connections
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between our approach and theirs in Section 3.5.1, and demonstrate how combining our spectral approach
with their analysis can sharpen some of the results in their setting.
From the economics literature, the techniques we use in Section 3 are similar to those of Galeotti,
Golub, and Goyal [16], though with differing motivations. In their work, they consider optimal inter-
ventions in the context of network games to induce favorable or unfavorable Nash equilibria from the
perspective of social welfare, whereas our motivation comes from opinion dynamics. Where these works
intersect is via the connection in [14] that the outcome of the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics can be viewed
as the equilibrium behavior of agents in a certain game with quadratic costs; therefore, under certain
assumptions on the underlying network and agent utilities, the behavior of agents is equivalent in both
settings. Where these approaches then differ is that we treat this equilibrium only as a behavioral as-
sumption and thus consider adversaries that attempt to optimize with respect to different objectives
from the opinion dynamics literature, not with respect to social welfare from the game that induces this
behavior; for instance, given our differing motivations, we are interested in quantities like inter-agent
discord and polarization, which are not equivalent to their social welfare. This distinction leads to our
different conclusions on adversary behavior in Section 3, where the entire spectral structure can be ex-
ploited by the adversary as opposed to just the extremal parts. We remark that Galeotti, Golub, and
Goyal consider optimal interventions in their setting under more general initial conditions via studying
the KKT conditions at optimality.
Our current work has thematic elements of all these papers; motivated by current events, we consider
optimization tasks in these dynamics. As mentioned above, we will largely view the underlying graph
topology as fixed, and we will consider instead the ability of an adversary to induce discord by supplying
internal opinions on some issue that previously was at consensus. We will be primarily concerned with
the interplay between graph structure and the adversary’s ability to do so. The opinion dynamics serve to
equilibrate any seeded opinions by an external actor, thus dampening the effect of the adversary; however,
the connections in the graph can also heighten the resulting disagreement. We also study these competing
effects using primarily spectral techniques and convex optimization. The network defense problem and
mixed-graph objectives we consider are, to the best of our knowledge, novel to this literature. These
models allow for opinion dynamics and disagreement to be slightly orthogonal processes and cannot be
completely characterized using the spectral theory of a single graph Laplacian. We hope that these kinds
of generalizations may prove an interesting direction for future work.
2 Preliminaries
Notation and Background. We start with briefly reviewing some basic facts from spectral graph
theory that we will use. In this work, we will consider simple, undirected, weighted graphs G = (V,E,w),
where |V | = n and w : E → R>0. We will usually write m =
∑
(i,j)∈E w(i, j) for the sum of the weights of
all edges in G; in the unweighted case, this is just the total number of edges. One can equivalently think
of G as being a complete graph, with w(i, j) = 0 if and only if (i, j) 6∈ E. We will usually require G to be
connected. The adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n is defined by Ai,j = Aj,i = w(i, j). Let D be the diagonal
degree matrix given by Di,i =
∑
j:(i,j)∈E w(i, j) and 0 off the diagonal. Then the Laplacian matrix of G
is given by L := D − A. It is well-known that L = ∑(i,j)∈E w(i, j)(ei − ej)(ei − ej)T , where ei ∈ Rn is
the ith standard basis vector, and that the quadratic form induced by L is given by
xTLx =
∑
(i,j)∈E
w(i, j)(x(i) − x(j))2.
It is immediate that L is symmetric and positive semidefinite. In general, I will denote the identity
matrix of appropriate dimension.
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We use standard notation for the Loewner (positive semidefinite) order, i.e. M1  M2 if and only if
M1 −M2  0 if and only if M1 −M2 is positive semidefinite. For any connected graph G as above, it is
well-known that L  0 and that
L =
n∑
i=1
λiviv
T
i ,
where 0 = λ1 < λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λn, the vi are orthonormal eigenvectors, and v1 = 1/
√
n, where 1 is the
all-ones vector in Rn. We will write Vi for the set of vectors of unit length in the λi-eigenspace of L.
Observe that if λi 6= λj for all i 6= j, then Vi = {±vi}. For more on the spectral theory of graphs, see for
instance [17, 18].
Given a symmetric matrix X ∈ Rn×n with eigendecomposition as above (though with not necessarily
nonnegative eigenvalues) and function f : R→ R, we define
f(X) =
n∑
i=1
f(λi)viv
T
i .
Note that if we stipulate that f(y) ≥ 0 for y ≥ 0, then if X  0, f(X)  0. For X  0, we write ‖X‖ for
the operator norm, or equivalently, the largest eigenvalue.
We will write ‖x‖p =
(∑n
i=1 |x(i)|p
)1/p
for the usual ℓp norms with 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, and ‖x‖0 = |{i ∈ [n] :
xi 6= 0}| for the sparsity-“norm” (note that this is not a norm in the usual sense). We will be interested
in this paper in the setting of p = 0, 1, 2,∞. We will also consider weighted-ℓ2 norms, defined for a vector
w ∈ Rn>0 by ‖x‖w =
√∑n
i=1w(i)x(i)
2. Note that with this convention, ‖ · ‖2 = ‖ · ‖1.
Friedkin-Johnson Dynamics. In this paper we will assume that opinions evolve using the Friedkin-
Johnson dynamics [3] (FJ dynamics), which we describe next. The dynamic is specified by an undirected
simple graph G = (V,E,w) and an initial, internal opinion vector s ∈ Rn. Starting with z(0) = s, each
node i ∈ V updates her opinion by taking the weighted average of her neighbors in G, as well her own
internal opinion:
z(t+1)(i) =
s(i) +
∑
j:(i,j)∈E w(i, j)z
(t)(j)
1 +
∑
j:(i,j)∈E w(i, j)
.
Notice that these equations implicitly normalize a weight of 1 on one’s private opinion. It is well-known
that these dynamics converge to a fixed point, and the limiting final opinion vector is given by
z = (I + L)−1s,
where L is the Laplacian of G.
3 Adversarial Optimization with Friedkin-Johnsen Dynamics
Throughout this section, we will consider variations on the following question: what initial opinions
should an adversary induce in a network maximize some objective function after the opinions diffused
according to the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics? And moreover, what qualitative features of the graph make
it robust to these perturbations?
We will show how many interesting and natural adversarial objectives can be posed as quadratic
forms related to the underlying graph Laplacian L. Moreover, we show how different interesting regimes
of the spectrum and eigendecomposition of L dictate the adversary’s power to achieve their objective for
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different variants. Formally, we will typically (though not always) be concerned in various formulations
of the following optimization problem for an adversary:
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−1f(L)(I + L)−1s, (1)
where f : R→ R satisfies f(y) ≥ 0 for y ≥ 0; this restriction is made to ensure that the above quadratic
form is nonnegative.1
The interpretation is that, on some issue that is currently at consensus in the graph, the adversary
will first supply initial opinions s, for instance via fake news or targeted advertisements. This is done
subject to a fixed norm constraint, which corresponds to a limited budget to perturb initial opinions
in this way. These opinions then diffuse and become “smoothed” through the underlying graph G via
the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics. The goal of the adversary is to choose these initial opinions in order
to maximally induce some desired effect, knowing that whatever initial opinions it seeds, the opinion
dynamics dictated by the underlying graph will inevitably partially equilibrate them. Of course, we will
be interested in functions f where the above holds some sort of physical meaning.
Two of the goals we consider for the adversary are the notions of disgareement and polarization
introduced by Musco, Musco, and Tsourakakis [11]:
Definition 3.1. Given any opinion vector x ∈ Rn and undirected graph G, the disagreement of G with
opinions x as ∑
(i,j)∈E
w(i, j)(x(i) − x(j))2 = xTLx,
where L is the graph Laplacian of G.
Similarly, given just an opinion vector x, we write
x := x− x
T1
n
· 1 = (I − 1
n
11T
)
x
as the de-meaned version of x obtained by subtracting off the average of x from each component. Then
the polarization of x is
‖x‖22 =
n∑
i=1
x(i)2.
In words, the polarization is a measure of variance for x.
3.1 Disagreement
First, we consider an adversary that seeds initial opinions subject to a norm constraint with the goal
of maximizing disagreement. In the framework above, this can be realized via the choice f(y) = y, and
yields the simple objective function
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1s. (2)
The crucial feature of this objective is the fact that L both dictates the measurement of disagreement,
and the opinion dynamics themselves. Somewhat surprisingly, for this objective function, the entire
eigenstructure of the graph can matter; as L is scaled in importance compared to I, the adversary passes
through each eigenspace in order as they optimize.
1We discuss different forms of budget constraints later in this section. We shall see that spectral analysis can be used to
study such constraints, though the connection to graph structure is not as clear.
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Theorem 3.1. For any graph G, the objective function (2) is upper bounded by R
2
4 . Moreover, if G is
connected and we consider the family of problems (2) with L(t) = tL for t > 0, then for any i > 1, there
exists a t > 0 such that R · Vi is an optimizer for this value of t.
Proof. By the variational characterization of eigenvalues of symmetric matrices, this amounts to under-
standing the spectrum of the matrix (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1. This matrix has eigenvalues
λi(L)
(1 + λi(L))2
, i = 1, . . . , n,
with the same corresponding eigenvectors as L. In particular, the optimal value of (2) turns out to be
R2 ·
(
maxi∈[n]
λi(L)
(1+λi(L))2
)
. Consider now the function g(x) = x
(1+x)2
. It is easy to compute g′(x) = 1−x
(1+x)3
,
from which it immediately follows that g is increasing for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and decreasing for x > 1, attaining
a peak of 1/4 at x = 1. This immediately gives the upper bound, where equality holds if and only if
λi(L) = 1 for some i ∈ [n].
For the second statement, as we vary L(t) = t · L with t > 0, the eigenvectors of L remain the same,
but the eigenvalues scale as t · λ2, . . . , t · λn. As t varies strictly between 0 to infinity, each nonzero
eigenvalue of t · L passes through the peak of the function g(x) at x = 1 when t = 1/λi(L). This im-
plies that for this value of t, the set of optimizers is R·Vi, the length R vectors in Vi, the λi-eigenspace.2
One way to interpret the previous theorem is by first considering the extreme ranges of tL. For t ≈ 0,
tL is negligible compared to I, and so (I + tL)−1 ≈ I. Physically, this corresponds to each individual
not really listening to their neighbors over their own initial opinion, so the opinion dynamics do not
substantially change the seeded opinion by the adversary. When this is the case, the above shows that
the optimal strategy for the adversary that seeks to induce maximum disagreement is to seed vectors in
the direction of Vn. In this case, by the quadratic form (2), the adversary’s strategy is to simply feed in
opinions that directly maximize disagreement in G, as the opinion dynamics are themselves negligible.
The actual vectors in the set Vn attempt to place different values on the two sides of each edge; in that
sense, the vectors in Vn can be thought of as solving a type of graph coloring problem [19]. The quantity
λn(L) itself is also known to be closely related to the size of maximum cuts in graphs, see for instance
[20, 21, 22].
On the other extreme, for large t, (I + tL)−1(tL)(I + tL)−1 ≈ 1tL†, where L† is the pseudo-inverse
of L. In this regime, the largest eigenvalue of L† is the inverse of the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of L,
which is just λ2, with corresponding optimizer proportional to v2. In general, it is well-known that λ2
and v2 are intimately connected to the normalized sparsest cut of G; if G is d-regular, then the famous
discrete Cheeger inequality asserts that λ2 is an approximation to the normalized sparsest cut to a factor
of Θ(
√
d) [17]. It is also known that some sweep cut of v2 yields a bipartition that attains this bound.
Therefore, in this large t regime where graph neighbors are higher weighted than internal opinions, the
initial opinion vector inducing maximal disagreement roughly corresponds to a sparse cut. Because the
graph interactions in the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics are so strong compared to the weight of the internal
opinions, the optimal strategy of the adversary is roughly to induce disagreement on along some sparse
cut of the graph.
As t varies between these two regimes, the above result implies that every nontrivial eigenvector
becomes relevant. In the intermediate range of t, the relative effects of tL in measuring disagreement and
tL in smoothing the initial opinions via the opinion dynamics directly conflict, which causes the adversary
2We remark that for certain values of t, there may exist optimizers that are not eigenvectors of L. The reason is that
because g is not injective, there may exist distinct eigenvalues of L that are maximal for g, so that both eigenspaces are
optimal, and therefore the span of these eigenspaces are optimal as well, even though most such vectors are not eigenvectors.
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to pass through each eigenspace. For different regimes of how the each individual weighs their internal
opinion to those of their neighbors, these effects balance in different ways, leading to this more interesting
connection between the eigenstructure of L and the adversary’s ability to induce large disagreement in a
network with these dynamics.
3.2 Repeated Disagreement
As a simple extension of one-period disagreement considered in Section 3.1, it is natural to consider a
similar objective taken over a longer time horizon. An analogous multi-period setting is the following:
the adversary supplies the initial opinions s, which the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics take to (I+L)−1s. In
the first period, the disagreement of this equilibrium opinion vector is measured, as before. In the next
period, the last period final opinions (I +L)−1s become the new initial opinions, which subsequently get
updated by the dynamics to (I + L)−2s; the disagreement of these opinions is then measured and added
to the first disagreement. This process is repeated for T + 1 periods, where T ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
One natural setting for this objective is the following: consider a setting where opinions solidify, then
update on a cyclic basis. For instance, during a U.S. election cycle, opinions might form along network
structure according to the FJ dynamics; however, once the elections happen, the final opinions can be
viewed as priors, or innate opinions, for the next cycle, at which point the dynamics will take hold once
again and so on. These sorts of repeated dynamics are consider by Chitra and Musco [23] in their work
on understanding filter bubbles in the FJ dynamics.
In this multi-period setting, the adversary’s problem is to maximize the total disagreement across all
time periods: putting this in our framework, this is
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−1
(
L+ (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1 + . . .+ (I + L)−TL(I + L)−T
)
(I + L)−1s.
To understand this setting, notice that we may work orthogonal to 1, as this gives zero objective value.
In this case, the relevant f function that acts on the eigenvalues becomes
f(x) =
T∑
i=0
x
(1 + x)2i
=
−(1 + x)−2T + (1 + x)2
2 + x
,
with the convention that the first term is zero when T =∞. We thus find that
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−1
(
L+ (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1 + . . . + (I + L)−TL(I + L)−T
)
(I + L)−1s
= R2 · max
1<i≤n
{−(1 + λi(L))−2(T+1) + 1
2 + λi(L)
}
Note that for T = 0, this reduces to the analysis of the first subsection. Rather curiously, for T =∞, this
implies that the optimizer of this infinite-period game is precisely R · V2, with corresponding objective
value R
2
2+λ2(L)
. While in the one-shot game considered above, any one of the eigenvectors could be the
relevant optimizer, the optimizer of this problem necessarily lies in the direction of V2.
3.3 Polarization and Disagreement
For a different objective, Musco, Musco, and Tsourakakis [11] considered the following cost metric on
opinions, which they term the polarization-disagreement index, obtained by taking the sum of the dis-
agreement of x in G and the polarization of x; the authors show that when this measure is done with
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final opinions x = (I+L)−1s, the polarization-disagreement index of the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics with
graph G and initial opinions s can be simplified to
sT (I + L)−1s.
Note that this is not quite of the form (1), though it is quite similar.
Suppose that an external adversary now chooses the internal opinions s to maximize the polarization-
disagreement index of the final opinions after undergoing the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics:
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−1s = max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I − 1
n
11T )(I + L)−1(I − 1
n
11T )s.
Theorem 3.2. For any graph G, the maximizer of the above maximization problem is ±R · V2, and the
resulting objective value is R
2
1+λ2
.
Proof. First, notice that for any vector s, we have ‖s‖2 ≥ ‖s‖2; this follows from the Pythagorean theorem
and decomposing s into the parts orthogonal to 1 (namely, s) and the projection onto 1. Because the
above maximization function only depends on the de-meaned version of s and is homogenous in s, we
may assume the adversary restricts to the subspace orthogonal to 1. As such, the problem becomes
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R,s⊥1
sT (I + L)−1s.
The eigenvalues of (I + L)−1 are 11+λi(L) for λi(L) the eigenvalues of L; as 1 is the eigenvector for the
largest eigenvalue 1 of this matrix, the variational characterization of eigenvalues implies that the above
is exactly
R2 · λn−1((I + L)−1) = R
2
1 + λ2(L)
,
and this is attained by the set of vectors R · V2, as desired.
In particular, it follows that when an adversary chooses s to maximize the polarization-disagreement
index of G under these dynamics, the only relevant structure of the network that determines its robustness
to these adversarial perturbations is precisely determined by the second smallest eigenvalue, and the initial
opinion vector inducing this are the corresponding eigenvectors. Under the connection between the second
smallest eigenvalue and eigenvectors of L and sparse cuts discussed above, Theorem 3.2 essentially asserts
that the ability of an adversary to induce polarization-disagreement in a graph G is essentially determined
by the existence of small normalized cuts. Moreover, the actual optimizer for initial opinion vector roughly
places large values on one side of a small cut and smaller values on the other side. As an immediate
corollary of the above result, we can obtain the following intuitive, but nontrivial fact:
Corollary 3.3. Let L be the set of Laplacians of weighted n-node graphs subject to the total edge weight
normalization Tr(L) = 2m. Then
argmin
L∈L
{
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−1s
}
=
2m
n(n− 1) · LKn ,
where LKn is the Laplacian of the unweighted simple complete graph Kn.
3
3The factor 2m
n(n−1)
is just to satisfy the total edge weight condition.
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Proof. From the proof of Theorem 3.2, for any fixed Laplacian L, the inner maximization yields the
objective value R
2
1+λ2(L)
; therefore, the claim is equivalent to showing that the Laplacian 2mn(n−1) ·LKn has
the maximum second-smallest eigenvalue among all L ∈ L.
To see this, observe that for any such L, λ1(L) = 0, and therefore
2m = Tr(L) =
n∑
i=2
λi(L) ≥ (n− 1) · λ2(L). (3)
It immediately follows that for any such Laplacian L, λ2(L) ≤ 2mn−1 ; we will be done if we can show that
this is attained for the claimed weighted complete graph. But it is not difficult to check that
λ2(LKn) = n; (4)
after scaling by 2mn(n−1) so that the trace condition is satisfied, we see that this upper bound on λ2 is
exactly attained, proving optimality. Moreover, this occurs if and only if all of the nonzero eigenvalues
are 2mn−1 by virtue of (3), which occurs if and only if the graph is the scaled complete graph.
This corollary thus states that the complete graph, appropriately weighted, is min-max optimal given
the adversary’s objective to induce maximal polarization-disagreement index when running the Friedkin-
Johnsen dynamics. More generally, any spectral expander will be robust to these adversarial perturbations,
see for instance [24].
3.4 Absolute Displacement
Along these lines, suppose now that the attacker simply seeks to displace opinions maximally from the
consensus at 0, measured in Euclidean norm. This too can be realized in the above setting: suppose that
f(y) ≡ 1, so that f(L) = I. In this case, the adversary solves the following problem:
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−2s = max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
‖(I + L)−1s‖22.
This latter identity shows that for this choice of f , the adversary’s goal is indeed to maximize the ℓ2-
norm of the final opinion vector (I +L)−1s, or equivalently, to displace the final opinions from the initial
consensus at 0 as much as possible. However,
(I + L)−2 =
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + λi)2
viv
T
i .
As before, we thus obtain
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤R
sT (I + L)−2s = R2 · λn((I + L)−2).
But recall that for any graph, the smallest eigenvalue of L is 0, with corresponding eigenvector ± 1√
n
· 1
(and this is unique if G is connected); as a result,
λmax((I + L)
−2) = 1,
and the unique maximizer (up to sign) is s = R√
n
1. In particular, for this optimization problem, the
network topology plays no role at all. This observation is quite similar to one made in the context of
opinion maximization in [13].
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3.5 Other Adversary Constraints
In the previous sections, we focused on the ℓ2-budget constraint, as this most cleanly elucidates the non-
trivial interplay between spectral structure and the optimal choices of the adversary for given objectives of
discord. In this section, we provide positive results in other settings; the first comes from the independent
work of Chen and Ra´cz [15], who consider the same disagreement objective as we do, but instead makes
the adversary sparsity-constrained, as well as restricted to a cube. We first show how a combination of
the spectral ideas above with their analysis can lead to a more refined bound on the adversary’s power
with these constraints.
We then consider the problem of the adversary choosing weights subject to an ℓ∞ constraint, say
‖s‖∞ = 1; it is not difficult to show that the adversary will choose a seed such that each component
has absolute value 1. One can think of this setting as allowing the adversary to partition the agents,
and then seed them separately a bounded amount. In this case, one can of course give a trivial spectral
bound for each objective. However, using known techniques from combinatorial optimization, we show
that it is possible to efficiently obtain an O(1) approximation to the adversary’s power in this setting, and
moreover, using known algorithms in this setting, obtain an explicit near-optimal vector for the adversary.
Finally, we consider the problem of an ℓ1 constrained adversary. However, in this version of the
problem, the problem becomes somewhat trivial, in that the adversary must pick from a fixed set of
vectors that themselves are graph-independent; still, we give a spectral argument that nonetheless gives
some bound on the adversary’s power, that is provably tight for the class of vertex-transitive graphs.
3.5.1 Sparsity-Constrained Adversary: Connection to Chen-Ra´cz
We now explain the setting independently considered by Chen and Ra´cz [15], as well as show how the
combining the techniques considered here with their methods can provide a slight strengthening of their
theoretical results. Their setup is the following: first, they allow the network to have nonzero initial
starting opinions s0 ∈ [0, 1]n and allow the adversary to perturb the initial opinions in [0, 1]n, but subject
to a k-sparsity constraint. That is, in their model, they consider the following optimization problem for
the adversary:
max
s∈[0,1]n:‖s−s0‖0≤k
sT (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1s. (5)
We now show how to combine their analysis with our spectral techniques to obtain slightly sharper
bounds than the results in their paper on the amount an adversary can induce discord.
Lemma 3.1 (Lemma 4.1 of [15]). For any s satisfying the above constraints,
‖(I + L)−1(s− s0)‖1 ≤ k. (6)
Proof. It is well-known that matrix norm induced by the ℓ1 vector norm is exactly the maximum largest
column sum. As 1 is a right and left eigenvector of (I + L)−1 with eigenvalue 1, and (I + L)−1ij =
eTi (I + L)
−1ej ≥ 0 by the repeated-averaging interpretation of the dynamics, this implies that I + L is
doubly stochastic, so every absolute column sum is 1. Thus ‖(I+L)−1(s−s0)‖1 ≤ ‖s−s0‖1 ≤ ‖s−s0‖0 ≤ k,
where the last fact uses the fact the difference componentwise is at most 1 and the sparsity constraint.
Lemma 3.2. For s0 ∈ [0, 1]n,
‖L(I + L)−1s0‖∞ ≤ dmax,
where dmax is the largest degree in G.
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Proof. Note that z0 := (I +L)
−1s0 ∈ [0, 1]n as we have seen that (I +L)−1 is doubly stochastic, so is a
positive contraction in ℓ∞ (this also follows from the repeated-averaging interpretation). Then
|(Lz0)i| =
∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
Li,j(z0)j
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣di(z0)i −
∑
j 6=i
Aij(z0)j
∣∣∣∣ ≤ max{di(z0)i, dimaxj (z0)j} ≤ dmax.
From these lemmas, we can now combine the ideas in [15] with the spectral approach of this work to
obtain a sharpened bound in this setting when k = Ω(
√
n). For convenience, we will write (I+L)−1L(I+
L)−1 as Σ.
Theorem 3.4 (Theorem 1.3 of [15]). For any graph G, the amount of disagreement an adversary can
add is bounded by
λmax(Σ)k +
√
kmin{2dmax
√
k, 2 · λmax(Σ)
√
n}. (7)
Proof. The difference between the disagreement of s and s0 after running the dynamics is easily seen to
be
2(∆s)T (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1s0 + (∆s)T (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1(∆s), (8)
where ∆s = s − s0. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz to the last term with the result in Theorem 3.1 gives an
upper bound of
‖(I + L)−1L(I + L)−1‖‖∆s‖22 ≤ λmax(Σ)k. (9)
The first term can be bounded in a couple of ways: using Ho¨lder’s inequality and Lemma 3.1 and 3.2,
one obtains
2(∆s)T (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1s0 ≤ 2‖(I + L)−1(∆s)‖1‖L(I + L)−1s0‖∞ ≤ 2kdmax. (10)
Another way to bound this first term is simply using Cauchy-Schwarz and Theorem 3.1 to get
2(∆s)T (I+L)−1L(I+L)−1s0 ≤ 2‖(∆s)‖2‖(I+L)−1L(I+L)−1s0‖2 ≤ 2·λmax(Σ)
√
k‖s0‖2 ≤ 2·λmax(Σ)
√
nk.
(11)
Therefore, we conclude that the increase in disagreement is bounded by
λmax(Σ)k +
√
kmin{2dmax
√
k, 2 · λmax(Σ)
√
n}. (12)
In [15], the authors achieve a bound of 8dmaxk. From this combined result here, coupled with the
previous sections, one obtains an improvement of the constants and dependence on dmax; moreover, this
shows that the dependence on dmax is unnecessary for dmax = Ω(
√
n/k). In fact, though the bound
attained here seems to be worse in the setting where dmax → 0, this is not so; it is trivial to see that
x
(1+x)2 ≤ x for x ≥ 0, so that λmax(Σ) ≤ λmax(L). By the Gershgorin circle theorem, one also has
λmax(L) ≤ 2dmax, thus giving an improvement in the small dmax setting as well.
We note that the linear dependence on k is indeed necessary in general.4 For instance, consider the
family of graphs Ln :=
1
nLKn . All nontrivial eigenvalues are located at λ = 1, hence are a worst-case
4By this, we just mean that there exists instances of L and s0 where the dependence in k is provably linear. It is
easy to see that for any L, there exists some s0 where the dependence on k is trivial. For any L, let s0 be a vector that
maximizes disagreement in the cube [0, 1]n (as the maximum of a convex function, it will lie in {0, 1}n, but that is not used
in the argument). Then no perturbation inside the cube can improve it, hence the dependence on k is trivial. It would be
interesting, as noted in [15], if one could show that the dependence on k is linear for “typical” instances, as suggested by
their empirical results.
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example for disagreement. Consider the vectors sk obtained by setting the first k entries to 1, with the
rest 0. It is easy to see that sk can be decomposed as
sk =
k√
n
1√
n
+
(√
k(n− k)
n
)
rk, (13)
where rk is a unit vector orthogonal to 1, hence an eigenvector of Σ with eigenvalue 1/4. Thus, if we
instantiate this sparsity-constrained problem with s0 = 0, we have
skΣsk =
k(n− k)
4n
= (1− k/n) · k
4
. (14)
In particular, for k < n/2 for instance, this is Ω(k).
3.5.2 ℓ∞-Constrained Adversary
Now consider the problem of the adversary choosing weights subject to an ℓ∞ constraint; for convenience,
we will write the disagreement problem5 as
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖∞=1
sT (I + L)−1L(I + L)−1s. (15)
For simplicity, again write the matrix as Σ. The first simple observation is that the optimal adversary
strategy s∗ will satisfy |s∗i | = 1 for all i; indeed, if one fixes s∗−i, then the objective is easily seen to
be linear in si, and therefore attains a maximum for s
∗
i ∈ {−1, 1}. In particular, the problem can be
rewritten as
max
s∈Rn:∀i si∈{±1}
sTΣs. (16)
In general, there does not appear to be any analytic solution to this problem.6 One always has the trivial
spectral bound λn(Σ) · n, just using the fact that the ℓ2-norm of the candidate solutions are all
√
n.
However, by leveraging deep results from functional analysis that have long been fruitfully applied to
combinatorial optimization, it is possible to give an efficient constant factor approximation:
Theorem 3.5. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a π/2-approximation to (16);
moreover, a vector s′ ∈ {−1, 1}n attaining this bound can be obtained efficiently.7
Proof. To prove the theorem, we apply Grothendieck’s inequality [25], which asserts for any positive
semidefinite matrix Z,
max
x∈Rn:∀i xi∈{±1}
xTZx ≤ max
x1,...,xn∈Sn−1
n∑
i,j=1
Zij〈xi,xj〉 ≤ π
2
max
x∈Rn:∀i xi∈{±1}
xTZx, (17)
where Sn−1 = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖2 = 1}. It is well-known that the middle expression is easily attained as the
solution to the semidefinite program
max
X∈Rn×n
Tr(ZX)
subject to Xii = 1
X  0,
5The corresponding results for any other positive semidefinite objective, like the others we considered before, follow in
exactly the same way.
6As we show in Remark 5.1 in Section 5, the generalization of this objective to the mixed-graph setting is actually easily
seen to be NP-hard.
7We ignore issues of bit complexity; if desired, one may assume that L is given as a rational matrix and that we will be
content with solutions up to ǫ accuracy.
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and therefore can be solved to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time. By setting Z to be our matrix Σ
and applying this result, it follows that the solution to this problem thus gives a π2 -approximation to the
adversary’s problem. We remark that, following the approach for the MAXCUT problem in [20], one can
appeal to strong SDP duality to obtain an equivalent, and slightly more analytic, spectral upper bound
of n · minx:xT1=0 λmax(Σ − diag(x)). This clearly improves on the trivial spectral bound given before,
though it is not clear in general what good test vectors x are to give an explicit better bound.
To actually obtain a ±1 vector attaining this bound compared to the optimum of the SDP, Alon and
Naor [25] show that randomized hyperplane rounding applied to the vectors attaining the SDP optimum
can be used to obtain a vector s that is at least 2π of the SDP optimum in expectation, hence of the
original problem .
3.5.3 ℓ1-Constrained Adversary
One may also consider an adversary that is bounded in ℓ1, which may be viewed as a more natural
restriction. However, in this case, the problem becomes trivial; again, we consider the disagreement
problem with matrix Σ, but all these results carry over for any other positive semidefinite objective.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose the adversary is now ℓ1-constrained, so that the optimization problem is
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖1=1
sTΣs. (18)
Then, an optimal adversary strategy is simply to set s = ei where i ∈ argmaxj∈[n]Σjj (that is, to put all
their budget on an index with largest diagonal term in Σ).
In this case, denoting the adversary’s power as D, we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
λi(L)
(1 + λi(L))2
≤ D ≤ max
i∈[n]
λi(L)
(1 + λi(L))2
≤ 1
4
, (19)
where the lower bound is sharp in the case of vertex-transitive graphs.
Proof. For an optimal adversary strategy, simply note that the ℓ1-ball is the convex hull of the set
{±e1, . . . ,±en}. As the maximum of a convex function over a convex set is attained at an extreme point,
it suffices to consider this set of strategies; by homogeneity, it suffices to just consider {e1, . . . , en}. But
when substituting these terms in the optimization problem, one then recovers the diagonal elements of
Σ, so the adversary may simply choose the largest such term.
The upper bound follows from the ℓ2 bound we gave before, using the fact that the ℓ1 unit ball is
contained in the ℓ2 unit ball. For the lower bound, observe that
n∑
i=1
eTi Σei =
n∑
i=1
Σii = Tr(Σ). (20)
As the trace of any matrix is equal to the sum of the eigenvalues, it follows there must exist a diagonal
element that is at least the average of the eigenvalues.
To see the tightness of the lower bound, consider any vertex-transitive graph. By definition, the
adjacency matrix is unchanged under the action of a transitive subgroup of the symmetric group. Any
vertex-transitive graph is regular, so the degree matrix is a multiple of the identity, hence also unchanged
under the action of any permutation; together, these imply that the Laplacian of the graph must be
invariant under the action of a transitive subgroup of the symmetric group. As a result, any rational
expression of the Laplacian is also invariant. By applying suitable automorphisms of the graph, this
implies that any two diagonal elements of any rational expression of the Laplacian must be equal, in
which case they are all equal to the average of the eigenvalues by the trace identity.
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4 Defending the Network
In this section, we consider the problem of defending a given network from adversarial perturbations like
those considered above. We will view this as a two-player min-max game; first, a network defender will
choose how to set some qualitative feature of the network subject to normalization constraints modeling
the resource limitation of the defender. Then, the adversary performs the above maximization problem
with this choice of settings. The goal of the defender is to choose a setting to minimize the cost of the
resulting system (e.g., the measure of disagreement), knowing that the adversary will optimize for this
choice. In this section, we show that, in one such formulation, the defender can efficiently do this via
solving an appropriate convex optimization problem.
We have generally adopted the convention that the network topology is basically fixed; it is unrealistic
to substantively change a real-world network structure. Therefore, in this formulation, the network
defender chooses how to vary the cost of the adversary in changing initial opinions of different nodes.
That is, the network defender can choose to weigh each node differently for example, by lessening their
exposure to misinformation, so that the adversary pays different costs for perturbing different nodes.
Formally, we consider the following problem: suppose the network defender is resource limited ac-
cording to a function h : Rn → R, such as the ℓ1-norm, and is permitted to change node-weights with the
restriction of h(w) = h(1). We will consider, under this resource constraint, what the defender’s optimal
choice of w is. More generally, we will assume that h is nonnegative, convex, and radially increasing and
homogeneous (i.e. for α ≥ 0, h(αx) = g(α)h(x), with g : R+ → R+ an increasing function), as well as
a function f : R → R as in (1) that induces a positive semidefinite quadratic form. Then the network
defender must solve the following optimization problem:
min
w∈Rn
>0:h(w)=h(1)
{
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖w≤R
sT (I + L)−1f(L)(I + L)−1s
}
. (21)
In words, the network defender chooses a weighted ℓ2-norm on the nodes of the network under the resource
constraint modeled by h that specifies costs of influencing each individual in the network heterogeneously;
with these weights and the same fixed budget R as before, the adversary then optimizes their objective.
For instance, if h is the ℓ1-norm, then this normalization imposes that
∑n
i=1wi =
∑n
i=1 1 = n, so that
the sum of weights on the nodes for the adversary is the same as for the regular ℓ2 norm. Other natural
choices for h include any norm on Rn or any sum of squares of linear expressions. As a result, w = 1 is
a valid choice of the network defender, in which case the inner maximization corresponds to the largest
eigenvalue of the relevant quadratic form as we have seen above. However, for other choices of w, the
inner maximization does not have the same interpretation and moreover, will not usually admit a clean
analytical expression as the maximization of a convex objective.
Here, we show that despite this difficulty, this can be reduced to convex optimization via a geometric
argument. For convenience, set R = 1; this is without loss of generality as the inner maximization is
homogeneous. Consider the following procedure:
1. Solve the following convex program with positive semidefinite constraints:
min
W
h(diag(W ))
subject to 0  (I + L)−1f(L)(I + L)−1 W
Wij = 0, ∀i 6= j.
2. Set w′ = diag(W ∗), where W ∗ is a solution to the above convex program.
3. Let t ≥ 0 be such that h(tw′) = h(1).
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4. Set w∗ = tw′.
We now show that this procedure gives the optimal setting of w.
Theorem 4.1. Under the restrictions on h and f , the above algorithm yields the optimal value of the
problem given by (21).
Proof. Let h and f be as required and write Σ = (I + L)−1f(L)(I + L)−1; by our assumption on f ,
Σ  0. For any fixed choice of w, the adversary’s optimal choice of s ∈ Rn is obtained by finding the
largest level set of the function xTΣx that nontrivially intersects the ellipsoid ‖x‖w ≤ 1. Equivalently,
the optimal value of the adversary is the smallest level set of xTΣx that contains the unit ball of the
norm induced by ‖ · ‖w. In particular, the optimal value of the inner maximization for fixed w is the
smallest value K ≥ 0 such that
{x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖w ≤ 1} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : xTΣx ≤ K} (22)
By the restriction on W to being diagonal in the above convex program (with necessarily nonnegative
diagonal entries by the PSD constraint), recall that W  Σ if and only if for all x ∈ Rn,
‖x‖2
w′
= xTWx ≥ xTΣx;
where w′ = diag(W ); geometrically, this is equivalent to the containment
{x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖w′ ≤ 1} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : xTΣx ≤ 1}. (23)
In particular, this means that Σ  W if and only if the unit ball of ‖ · ‖w′ is contained in the unit
ball of the (semi)-norm induced by Σ. Let W ∗ and w′ = diag(W ∗) be as stated, and let t ≥ 0 be such
that h(tw′) = h(1). By the minimality of w′ as well as the positive homogeneity, this implies that if
the optimal value of the inner maximization for (21) using tw′ is K, then using homogeneity of the
containments:
{x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖tw′ ≤ 1√
K
} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : xTΣx ≤ 1}
⇐⇒ {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖w′ ≤ 1√
t ·K } ⊆ {x ∈ R
n : xTΣx ≤ 1};
as such, K = 1/t.
Suppose now for a contradiction that an optimizer w∗ of (1) has strictly smaller objective value
K∗ < 1/t than that of tw′. By (22), this is equivalent to
{x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖w∗ ≤ 1√
K∗
} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : xTΣx ≤ 1}
⇐⇒ {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖K∗w∗ ≤ 1} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : xTΣx ≤ 1}.
Evidently, K∗w∗ satisfies (23) yet
h(K∗w∗) = g(K∗)h(w∗) < g(1/t)h(tw′) = h(w′).
This violates the optimality of w′, yielding the desired contradiction.
Note that for certain choices of h(·), the above can be written as a standard semidefinite program.
For instance, if h(x) = ‖x‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi|, then the above is indeed a regular semidefinite program. If
h is instead the squared ℓ2-norm, one can similarly write it as a semidefinite program by adding extra
positive semidefinite constraints and exploiting Schur complements; we omit the details here.
18
5 Mixed-Graph Objectives
In the previous sections, we have connected an adversary’s ability to induce discord in a network with the
spectral theory of the underlying graph, as well as considered ways to defend against these attacks. In each
of these settings, these results suggest that the opinion dynamics of the network will necessarily “soften”
the effect of these attacks, as the disagreement is measured on the edges of the same network that dictate
the opinion dynamics. However, one potential explanation of the success of recent adversarial attacks
described in the introduction is that the opinion formation graph and disagreement measurement graph
need not be the same, and may not even look similar. For instance, opinion formation may take place
on the “online” network, via social media, while the disagreement the adversary cares about maximizing
may be measured with respect to “real-world” connections. When this occurs, it need not be the case
that the opinion dynamics implicitly equilibrate disagreements measured along the latter graph. When
opinion formation and the disagreement graph look quite different, one expects that an adversary will be
able to induce significantly more disagreement.
In this section, we explore the degree to which the adversary’s power can increase when the opinion
formation graph and measurement graph become independent. First, we provide nontrivial examples that
show that, in some cases, having a different graph for the opinion dynamics and for the disagreement
measurement can actually reduce the adversary’s power to induce disagreement ; however, we provide a
general lower bound that indicates that typically, the adversary will not be much worse off, if at all. We
then show that the relevant relationship that will determine when an adversary gains extra power is an
appropriate notion of spectral similarity between the two graphs, not necessarily physical similarity. We
conclude this section by showing concretely how a large cut misalignment in the graphs will enable an
adversary to induce disagreement far beyond what is possible in the spectral theory in the single-graph
setting.
Formally, we generalize the previous sections as follows: suppose that there are now two relevant graph
structures on [n], G1 and G2, with associated Laplacians L and M (which will be the “measurement”
Laplacian). The first graph, G1, is the graph structure on which the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics take
place while the second graph, G2, is the graph where disagreement is measured. In this setting, the
adversary chooses initial opinions to maximize the following objective (setting R = 1 for notational ease):
max
s∈Rn:‖s‖2≤1
sT (I + L)−1M(I + L)−1s = λmax((I + L)−1M(I + L)−1).
Typically, we will be interested in settings where L and M are of comparable size, meaning similar total
edge weight. If not, say if L has much larger edge weight thanM , then the effects of the opinion dynamics
will cause all opinions to smooth to a much larger degree compared to the measurement measured via
M , so the problem becomes degenerate though not for a theoretically interesting reason.
Remark 5.1. We note that the ℓ∞ version of the adversary problem in this setting is easily seen to be
NP-hard. The reason is that one can let M be the Laplacian of any graph, and simply set L to be the
trivial graph with no edges, at which point the problem can be shown to be precisely MAXCUT (see Section
5.1 for the relation to cuts). As such, by appealing to various complexity-theoretic assumptions, one can
easily establish hardness-of-approximation results for this version of the problem [26, 27]. In particular,
it is NP-hard to attain an approximation within better than a 17/16-factor of the optimum in general and
UGC-hard to obtain a solution within a factor of better than αGW ≈ 1.14 of the optimum in general with
an ℓ∞-adversary.
In general, it is not obvious how to connect the spectral structure of the above matrix with the spectral
properties of the two underlying graphs, unless in the special case where the two graphs commute (and
therefore, share an eigenbasis); this is indeed possible in certain special cases.
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Example 5.1. Suppose G1 is a d-regular, unweighted graph, and let G2 be the n−d−1-regular, unweighted
complementary graph. Then one can check that M = nI−J−L, where J is the matrix of all-ones. Every
matrix on the right side shares an eigenbasis, hence L and M commute. Similarly, suppose that G1 or
G2 is a scaled version of the unweighted complete graph Kn. Then it is easy to check that LKn commutes
with every graph Laplacian L as they will share a common eigenbasis.
One might suspect that, fixing M , L = M is the optimal choice of graph Laplacian (subject to
normalization) to minimize the amount of disagreement an adversary can induce. That is, letting L be
the set of graph Laplacians subject to the edge normalization Tr(L) = Tr(M), one might guess that
M ∈ argmin
L∈L
λmax((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1).
However, this does not hold in general, via the following simple construction.
Example 5.2. Suppose that G2 is a complete graph, in the sense that for some ǫ > 0, all off-diagonals
of the Laplacian satisfy
M(i, j) < −ǫ.
If we write out M in the eigenbasis as
M =
n∑
i=2
λi(M)viv
T
i
and further suppose for simplicity that 1 < λ2(M) < λ3(M), so that all nonzero eigenvalues lie on the
right side of the peak of the function f(x) = x/(1 + x)2 at x = 1. If we then set L =M , we would get an
objective value of
λ2(M)
(1 + λ2(M))2
,
as we have seen before. But consider instead the matrix
L = (λ2(M) + η)v2v
T
2 + (λ3(M)− η)v3vT3 +
n∑
i=4
λi(M)viv
T
i
for some η > 0 sufficiently small (depending on ǫ). It is easy to see that L ∈ L as the sum of eigenvalues,
and therefore the trace, is constant, and moreover, L will still be a Laplacian (with nonpositive off-diagonal
entries) of some other graph by continuity. As L and M share an eigenbasis, it is easy to see that for η
small enough,
λmax((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) =
λ2(M)
(1 + λ2(M) + η)2
which is strictly smaller than if L =M .
Example 5.3. In a more interesting example, suppose now that we further require that (L)i,i = (M)i,i
for each i. This means that each node has the same weighted degree in both graphs, which in particular
implies they have the same trace. First, consider G2 = C4, the four node unweighted cycle graph.
One can numerically check that among all graphs G1 satisfying this normalization, the mixed objective
(I+L)−1M(I+L)−1 is minimized when G1 is a weighted complete graph where each edge in the cycle has
weight reduced from 1 to approximately .89, and the remaining two edges are increased from 0 to .22. The
mixed objective has value approximately 0.1929, whereas the single-graph objective (I+M)−1M(I+M)−1
has largest eigenvalue 2/9 ≈ .22. For comparison, when G1 is instead set to the appropriately scaled copy
of the complete graph, the mixed-objective actually rises to .2975. On the other hand, when G2 = P4, the
unweighted path graph on four nodes, it is numerically optimal for itself under the mixed-graph objective
for all graphs satisfying the degree constraint. We are unaware of an analytic reason why this holds.
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However, one expects that these examples are largely pathological. As a first approximation to
controlling this quantity, our first result is the following general bound for positive semidefinite matrices.
The idea is to apply the Courant-Fischer theorem to subspaces spanned by the eigenvectors of the two
matrices to lower bound the spectral norm of the product of matrices.
Lemma 5.1. Let B,C ∈ Rn×n be positive semidefinite matrices with eigenvalues in increasing order.
Then
max
k≤n
{
λn−k+1(C)2λk(B)
}
≤ λn(CBC) = ‖CBC‖2 ≤ λn(C)2λn(B).
Proof. Note that CBC  0 by the fact B  0. The upper bound follows directly from the submul-
tiplicativity of the operator norm, which for symmetric positive-semidefinite matrices is just the top
eigenvalues.
For the lower bound, we use the Courant-Fischer theorem. First, note that if λn−k+1(C) = 0, the
result is trivial, so suppose it is strictly positive. Let U be the linear subspace spanned by the top k
eigenvectors of C, and let V be the subspace spanned by the top n − k + 1 eigenvectors of B. These
subspaces must intersect non-trivially by a simple dimension argument, so there exists some z ∈ U ∩ V
with unit length. Note that U is an invariant subspace for C, and moreover, C is bijective on U by
the nondegeneracy of λn−k+1(C). Now, let x = C−1z, where we view C−1 as restricted to U . By the
variational formula of λn,
λn(CBC) ≥ x
TCBCx
‖x‖22
=
zTBz
zTC−2z
≥ λk(B) ‖z‖
2
2
‖C−1z‖22
=
λk(B)
‖C−1z‖22
The second inequality follows from Courant-Fischer, as z lies in the span of the top n−k+1 eigenvectors
of B by assumption, so the quadratic form in the numerator gives at least λn−(n−k+1)+1(B)‖z‖2 =
λk(B)‖z‖2. Then ‖C−1z‖2 ≤ λmax(C−1)2‖z‖2 = ‖z‖
2
λn−k+1(C)2
, as the largest eigenvalue of C−1 restricted
to U is the inverse of the smallest eigenvalue of C restricted to U . Plugging this in gives the desired
inequality. As this holds for all k ≤ n, it holds for the maximum.
From this simple lemma, one can immediately obtain a lower bound in the adversary’s optimization
problem in the mixed-graph setting.
Corollary 5.1. Let L,M be as above. Then
λmax((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) ≥ max
1≤k≤n
λk(M)
(1 + λk(L))2
.
Proof. This is immediate from the previous lemma, with B =M and C = (I+L)−1, simply noting that
λn−k+1((I + L)−1) =
1
1 + λk(L)
.
Using just this lower bound, in the special case where M = LKn , the Laplacian of the unweighted
complete graph on n nodes, it follows that the optimal choice of L subject to having the same trace as
LKn to minimize the mixed-graph objective is just LKn itself. This holds because for any graph Laplacian
L satisfying Tr(L) = Tr(LKn), a similar argument to that of Corollary 3.3 implies that some nontrivial
eigenvalue of L1 must be at most n. The lower bound of the previous corollary then asserts that the
mixed-graph objective can only increase, with equality if and only if L = LKn .
Moreover, the previous corollary asserts that if the eigenvalues of L and M are only numerically
similar in the appropriate ordering, then necessarily the objective value will be approximately at least
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the corresponding objective value we considered in Section 3.1. Explicitly, this will arise for any graphs
with cospectral Laplacians; for instance, any isomorphic graphs will have this property (so in particular,
if M and L differ by a permutation), as will any strongly regular graphs with same parameters. This
suggests that while we have shown explicit examples where having two distinct matrices can even reduce
the adversary’s power, this case ought be viewed as rather pathological.
5.1 Spectral Similarity
The above analysis relied only on a general lower bound involving positive semidefinite matrices. Next,
we aim to characterize the relevant structure of L and M that causes the objective function to remain
quite close to the value in the single-graph case, and similarly when the objective function will increase.
The former case will indicate that an adversary gains little benefit from the misalignment of G1 and G2,
while the latter case corresponds to an underlying network that can be sharply exploited to induce large
disagreement. Intuitively, if L ≈M component-wise, then
λmax((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) ≈ λmax((I +M)−1M(I +M)−1),
by the continuity of matrix inverses and eigenvalues. Before proceeding, we need a definition:
Definition 5.1. For any graph G = (V,E,w) and S, T ⊆ V such that S ∩ T = ∅, we define
cutG(S, T ) =
∑
i∈S,j∈T
wG(i, j).
We will write cutG(S) := cutG(S, S
c).
For any subset S ⊆ [n], we write χS for the ±1 indicator vector of S, i.e. χS(i) = 1 if i ∈ S and −1
if i 6∈ S. Then it is easy to see that ‖χS‖2 = n, and that for any graph G with Laplacian L,
χTSLχs =
∑
(i,j)∈Ei
wG(i, j)(χS(i)− χS(j))2
= 4
∑
i∈S,j 6∈S
wG(i, j) = 4cutG(S).
We can now provide a quantitative form of this assertion:
Theorem 5.2. Let G1, G2 be n-node graphs with Laplacians M and L, respectively. Suppose that the
following holds for some parameters η, γ, ǫ > 0:
1. For each i ∈ [n], the weighted symmetric difference of their neighborhoods is bounded by η, i.e. for
all i ∈ [n] ∑
j 6=i
|w1(i, j) − w2(i, j)| ≤ η. (24)
2. For all i ∈ [n], the absolute difference in weighted degrees of i in G1 and G2 is at most γ.
3. For any disjoint subsets S, T ⊆ [n], we have
|cutG1(S, T )− cutG2(S, T )| ≤ ǫ
√
|S||T |. (25)
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Then, we have
max
i∈[n]
λi(M) − 2∆
(1 + λi(M) + ∆)2
≤ λn((I + L)−1M(I + L)−1) ≤ max
i∈[n]
λi(M) + 2∆
(1 + λi(M)−∆)2 , (26)
where ∆ = O(ǫ ln(η/ǫ) + γ). In particular, if all nodes have the same weighted degree in both G1 and G2,
∆ = O(ǫ ln(η/ǫ)).
Remark 5.2. Before proceeding with the proof, note that if one only assumes the first condition above,
and even if every node has the same degree in both graphs (therefore satisfying the second condition with
γ = 0), the best bound one can generically get on the spectral radius of M − L is O(η) using the fact
that the largest eigenvalue of a matrix is at most the largest ℓ1 norm of a row. When the combinatorial
structures are assumed to be very similar along every subset, as is done here, the dependence on η becomes
logarithmic, and gains from the closeness in the ǫ term as well.
Proof. First, by our assumptions, we may apply Lemma 3.3 of Bilu and Linial [28], where we just note
that if u is the {0, 1} indicator of S and v is the {0, 1} indicator for T for some disjoint subsets S, T ⊆ [n],
then
|uT (M − L)v| = |cutG1(S, T )− cutG2(S, T )|. (27)
We also note that by inspecting the proof of that lemma, one can apply our condition (2) with parameter
γ instead of O(ǫ ln(η/ǫ)) by just paying it in the bound, from which it follows that ∆ := ‖M − L‖ ≤
O(ǫ ln(η/ǫ) + γ).
From this, we have
L−∆ · I M  L+∆ · I, (28)
which in turn implies
(I + L)−1(L−∆ · I)(I + L)−1  (I + L)−1M(I + L)−1  (I + L)−1(L+∆ · I)(I + L)−1. (29)
Finally, note that by Weyl’s monotonicity theorem, we have max{λi(M) −∆, 0} ≤ λi(L) ≤ λi(M) + ∆.
Combining all these bounds with another application of Weyl’s monotonicity theorem, we have
max
i∈[n]
λi(M)− 2∆
(1 + λi(M) + ∆)2
≤ λn((I + L)−1M(I + L)−1) ≤ max
i∈[n]
λi(M) + 2∆
(1 + max{λi(M)−∆, 0})2 . (30)
That high physical similarity of the graphs implies the problem is not changed significantly is not
particularly surprising, though the previous result gives exponentially better dependence on the physical
similarity than what can be attained by naive applications of matrix perturbation bounds. However,
we now show that high physical similarity edge-by-edge is merely sufficient, but not necessary ; another
relevant property that will ensure that this holds is spectral similarity, as defined by Spielman and Teng
[29].
Definition 5.2. L and M are ǫ-spectral approximations for each other for some ǫ > 0 if
1
1 + ǫ
L M  (1 + ǫ)L.
Note that this definition is symmetric in L and M . It is easy to show from this definition that if L
and M are ǫ-spectral approximations of each other, then the adversary’s objective value cannot differ too
much from the single-graph setting with just M .
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Theorem 5.3. Suppose that L and M are ǫ-spectral approximations of each other. Then
1
1 + ǫ
max
i∈[n]
min
c∈[ 1
1+ǫ
,1+ǫ]
cλi(M)
(1 + cλi(M))2
≤ λmax((I+L)−1M(I+L)−1) ≤ (1+ǫ)max
i∈[n]
max
c∈[ 1
1+ǫ
,1+ǫ]
cλi(M)
(1 + cλi(M))2
.
Proof. The proof is essentially immediate from the definition: pre- and post-multiplying by (I + L)−1,
we immediately get from the definition that
1
1 + ǫ
(I + L)−1L(I + L)−1  (I + L)−1M(I + L)−1  (1 + ǫ)(I + L)−1L(I + L)−1.
By Weyl’s monotonicity theorem, this implies the corresponding inequality on each of the eigenvalues.
We deduce that
1
1 + ǫ
λn((I + L)
−1L(I + L)−1)  λn((I + L)−1M(I + L)−1)  (1 + ǫ)λn((I + L)−1L(I + L)−1).
To relate this back to the matrix (I +M)−1M(I +M)−1, we again use Weyl’s monotonicity theorem, as
then for each i ∈ [n],
1
1 + ǫ
λi(L) ≤ λi(M) ≤ (1 + ǫ)λi(L).
In particular, λi(L) lies in the (1 + ǫ)-neighborhood of λi(M). We showed above that
λmax((I +M)
−1M(I +M)−1) = max
i∈[n]
λi(M)
(1 + λi(M))2
;
plugging in these “fuzzy” versions of the eigenvalues gives the desired inequalities.
Remark 5.3. Note that while the definition of spectral similarity is symmetric, it need not commute
nicely with positive rational expressions of the Laplacians. The reason is that in general, positive rational
expressions need not be operator monotone, i.e. may not respect the Loewner order. For instance,
0  A  B does not imply A2  B2, requiring us to appeal to Weyl’s monotonicity theorem to translate
between M and L.
As a corollary, this result shows that it is not necessary for L and M to be extremely close in, say,
Frobenius or ℓ1 norm on each row for the eigenvalues for the adversary’s objective value to remain close
to the single-graph setting. This is because by seminal results of Batson, Spielman, and Srivastava, every
graph Laplacian has a weighted ǫ-spectral approximation that corresponds to a graph with O(n/ǫ2)
edges [12]. Necessarily, these graphs are physically quite different, as they can differ in Θ(n2) entries.
The previous result shows that this is irrelevant; in the mixed-graph objective function, replacing one of
these graphs by the other does not meaningfully change the adversary’s power to induce disagreement
under the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics.
5.2 Spectral Dissimilarity
In this section, we provide a partial converse to the previous section; we provide a simple condition that
will imply that the relevant largest eigenvalue is large that relates to the spectral dissimilarity of L and
M . We then show how this can be realized in the special case of cuts in G1 and G2; it will turn out that
if G1 and G2 are highly misaligned in the sense of having even one drastically different vertex cut, then
the largest eigenvalue is necessarily large.
Definition 5.3. We say L and M are (ǫ, η)-bad spectral approximations if there exists x ∈ Rn with
‖x‖2 = n such that xTLx ≤ ǫ and xTMx ≥ η.
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This definition implies that M and L are not η/ǫ-spectral approximations for each other, but we
will crucially be interested in the actual values, not just the ratio. Moreover, notice that this is not
symmetric in the directions of the inequalities, and we will actually care about the numerical values, not
just the ratio. For these reasons, the following does not constitute an exact converse, which is essentially
immediate from this definition:
Proposition 5.4. Suppose that L and M are (ǫ, η)-bad spectral approximations. Then
λn((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) ≥ η
n+ (‖L‖+ 2)ǫ .
Proof. This follows from the variational characterization of eigenvalues:
λn((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) = max
z∈Rn
zT (I + L)−1M(I + L)−1z
zT z
= max
z∈Rn
zTMz
zT (I + L)2z
.
The proof follows from plugging in the guaranteed vector x, simply noting that
xT (I + L)2x ≤ xT (I + 2L+ L2)x ≤ n+ (‖L‖+ 2)ǫ.
This abstract result shows that if L and M are spectrally misaligned in the above sense, then the
largest eigenvalue of the mixed-graph objective is large. Tangibly, one specific way that this can occur is
the if L and M have very different cut structure. Plugging in characteristic vectors into Proposition 5.4
and taking the maximum yields
Corollary 5.5. For any L,M ,
λn((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) ≥ max
S⊆V
4cutG2(S)
n+ 4(‖L‖+ 2)cutG1(S)
≥ max
S⊆V
4cutG2(S)
n+ 8(∆G1 + 1)cutG1(S)
,
where ∆G1 is defined to be the largest degree in G1.
Proof. The only new statement comes from noticing ‖L‖ ≤ 2∆G1 ; this follows from the Gershgorin
circle theorem, as the maximum absolute row sum of L is at most 2∆G1 .
By directly analyzing the Rayleigh quotients, we can also obtain a slightly different bound for such
vectors:
Proposition 5.6. For any L,M ,
λn((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) ≥ max
S⊆V
4cutG2(S)/n
(1 + 2
√
2cutG1(S)/
√
n)2
Proof. The proof proceeds analogously by plugging in χS into the Rayleigh quotient for λn. Indeed,
λn((I + L)
−1M(I + L)−1) ≥ χ
T
SMχS
‖(I + L)χS‖22
=
4cutG2(S)
‖(I + L)χS‖22
.
25
It suffices to upper bound the denominator. By the Triangle Inequality,
‖(I + L)χS‖2 ≤ ‖χS‖2 + ‖LχS‖2 =
√
n+ ‖LχS‖2.
Moreover, again by the Triangle Inequality
‖LχS‖2 =
∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈S,j 6∈S
2wG1(i, j)(ei − ej)
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 2
√
2cutG1(S).
Plugging in this estimate and factoring out n gives the claim.
These results show that if the opinion and disagreement graphs are misaligned on even one large
cut of G2, then the adversary will be able to induce disagreement far beyond what is possible in the
single-graph objective. As an example, consider an extreme case, where G2 is a complete unweighted
bipartite graph on 2n nodes, while G1 is two n-node cliques on both sides of the bipartition with o(
√
n)
edges between them. Then if S is one side of the bipartition, cutG2(S) = n
2, while cutG1(S) = o(
√
n).
The estimate given by the Proposition 5.6 yields that the adversary can induce disagreement ≈ 2n, which
is tight even up to constants in light of the upper bound in Lemma 5.1. This is sharper than the generic
bound obtained in Corollary 5.5, which is off asymptotically by a factor of o(
√
n).
6 Discussion and Open Problems
In this paper, we have shown how several natural adversarial actions on networks that have been promi-
nent in recent years can be modeled as optimization problems with a standard model of opinion dynamics.
By leveraging the well-known connections between the spectral and combinatorial structures of graphs,
we are able to gain significant insights into the nature of graphs that are resilient to these outside per-
turbations.
We believe that studying mixed-graph objectives can be a fruitful future direction; as in our results
above, this generalization provides an explanation for how disagreement can arise from outside influence
far beyond what can be predicted from the spectral theory arising from considering only a single graph.
Similarly, network defense problems like the one we consider here will be of continued relevance as
attackers can perturb opinions in a more sophisticated fashion than we have considered here. A more
refined study of such problems may give significant actionable insights on how to circumvent these new
forms of adversarial behavior.
Two natural, albeit difficult, directions are generalizing these sorts of problems and analyses to di-
rected graphs, as well as considering models where graphs and opinions co-evolve, as in the Hegselmann-
Krause model [4]. Directed graphs, while having significantly less spectral structures, are a more natural
model for influences and opinion dynamics on graphs; similarly, one expects that real-world networks tend
to change directly as a result of opinion dynamics. However, even simple models like Hegselmann-Krause
pose significant mathematical challenges that make this study quite difficult. Overcoming either of these
barriers would enable one to study many more naturally occurring sociological phenomena.
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